I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad-hoc networks are prone to. security attacks, with node mobility being the primary. cause in allowing security breaches. As 'the information regarding the mobile node needs to be updated continuously in Mobile Ad Hoc networks (MANETS), the network is more susceptible to Byzantyne faults such as misrouting, corrupting and dropping packets. This makes the network more vulnerable to attack or disruption due to faulty nodes and so solutions that are native and more relevant to ad-hoc networks are needed. The nature of these attacks is such that they consume resources associated with various network elements. This impedes the efficient functioning-and provision of services in accordance with their. intended purpose [3] ; 141, [9] . There must be means to provide reasonable protection for mobile nodes from malicious networks and-for networks against malicious nodes. Unfortunately, current -protocol architectures do not provide adequate support for such protection. Motivated by these needs, this paper takes a fresh look at security management from a real-time perspective and proposes solutions using an Unobtnrsive inoiiroring technique which does not require modification of all, the nodes in the network and relies on already existing network information to detect the presence of malicious nodes. ;
The proposed mechanism is similar to an intrusion detection system that monitors system logs and activity to determine if the system is under;attack. This technique combines information available at'different network levels and is designed with the following principles in mind . In section I1 a review of related research is presented. The unobtrusive monitoring technique is introduced in section 111. In section IV the methodology for the unobtrusive monitoring technique is presented. Results of our simulation experiments are presented in section V. In section VI conclusions and future research is presented.
RELATED WORK
There are three steps in handling a malicious node. First it . .. is important to identify that a node has mishandled packets intentionally. Second, the identity of the malicious node must be determined. The third step is to isolate 'the malicious node from the network or cope with the issue. Several solutions have been proposed to address these problems.
A. Malicioiis Behavior Detection

~
In the route-based distributed packet filtering technique [I51 the algorithm performs routability checks on incoming packets. Filters are placed at key points in a network, unlike perfect ingress filtering which places filters at every node.
Implementing this would require modifying some or all of the nodes in the network. Watchdog [I21 is a technique where each node "snoops" the retransmission of every packet it forwards. If the watchdog detects that the node has not correctly retransmitted the packet, it can raise a warning. Again, this requirk modification of some or all of the nodes in the network and is 0-7803-8104-1/03/%17.00 02003 IEEE
The audit trail approach facilitates tracing via traffic logs at routers and gateways [16] . This method is suitable for the off-line traceback of DoS (Denial of Service) attacks. It incurs significant storage and processing overhead at the routers. In behavioral monitoring [13], the likely behavior of a malicious node during a DoS attack is monitored to identify the source. For example, the malicious node may perform DNS (Domain Name Server) requests to resolve the name of the target host which may not be resident in its local name server's cache. During a DoS attack, the malicious node launching the attack may try to gauge the impact of the attack using various service requests including Web and ICMP echo requests. Thus maintaining a log of such events and activities may reveal information about the malicious node. IP traceback [I71 is similar to the mechanism used by the "trace route" command.
In IP traceback, packets are sent out with ever-increasing timeto-live values, and listen for returning ICMP Time Exceeded packets. This may not work in all cases, especially if the malicious node chooses to judiciously handle the traceroute packet correctly.
C. Isolation oJMalicioirs Node
Whenever a node identifies a malicious node, it broadcasts a special blacklist message [12]. When a node receives a blacklist message, it removes the blacklisted node from all of its routes, effectively isolating the node. A voting mechanism can also be used where each blacklist message counts as a vote, and a node is only blacklisted after receiving a minimum number of votes. A major disadvantage of blacklisting is that it makes the network vulnerable to DoS attacks and requires modification of all nodes on the network. With pathrating [IZ], each node maintains rating of all paths to all other nodes it knows about. The rating for each path increases with each good transmission and decreases each time a broken link is detected. The rating for each path containing a malicious node is identified along with the path. This can be seen as an extension to blacklisting.
D. Research Challenges
The solutions proposed so far can either be not adapted to MANETS or they are expensive to implement and require the modification of all the nodes in the network. Moreover it is important to develop solutions that are scalable, implementable, and capable of detecting malicious behavior while the communication is in progress. Techniques such as nodes bearing grudges rely on security associations between different nodes in the network. This can be accomplished through the use of a Certificate Authority which requires infrastructure support that MANETS lack. Another challenge to implementing the techniques is that they involve modification in most or all developed primarily for ad hoc networks operating with omnidirectional transmissions. Another variation of this technique "nodes bearing grudges" proposed in [2] requires security associations between nodes to authenticate messages.
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of the nodes in the network. In addition, they consume the battery life of the mobile devices to perform the overhead of cryptographic operations.
UNOBTRUSIVE MONITORING
The heart of the unobtrusive monitoring technique is the detection manager which is responsible for collecting and analyzing locally available data. The detection manager is implemented on the source nodes requesting service. Local data such as DSR route request and route error messages, ICMP time exceeded and destination unreachable messages, and TCP timeouts are fed into the detection manager. The data collection component takes these messages and events and extracts useful information from them. This information includes the following:
The location of broken links in DSR route error messages. The address of a node that was unable to deliver a packet in an ICMP destination unreachable message and the destination of that packet.
. The address of a node that dropped a packet whose tinieto-live had expired from an ICMP time exceeded message and the destination of the original packet.
. The destination of a TCP packet that timed out. . New routes from unsolicited route reply messages.
The time that each message was received or each event occurred. The data collection component extracts useful information and passes that data to the data storage component which in turn files the data for use by the data analysis component. Data is periodically purged to reduce the storage overhead, which is important for memory constrained nodes. This also ensures that the data analysis component is only working with recent and more relevant data. Finally, the data analysis component processes the stored data to determine if any nlalicious activity is taking place. If there is undesirable activity, the detection manager then alerts the node so that it can take appropriate action.
: .
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A. Exuniple Scenario
We present a scenario to demonstrate how the unobtrusive monitoring technique uses information from route error message to detect malicious activity. In our example as shown in Figure 1 , node S is source and node D is destination and the path S-M-D was found by the routing protocol during the discovery phase. Assume that M, the malicious node drops packets from node S which are destined for node D. There must be a distinction made between packet dropping arising due to broken links from malicious behavior.
First the detection manager checks if there are any route error messages indicating the broken links. In the absence of route error messages, the detection manager checks if any TCP packets have timed out and no TCP acknowledgement has been received. If this is the case, it raises a flag indicating malicious activity. In this section, th,e methodology for the proposed research is described and results of our initial investigation aTe reported. We used the Nehvork Sinirdator -ns-2 [IS] , a discrete event simulator, to simulate an ad-hoc wireless network running the DSR routing protocol. The simulations were performed using a modified version of ns-2 (to be specific, version 2.lb9a).
Experiment were conducted for two scenarios: (i) randomly generated stationary networks and (ii) randomly generated mobile networks. Simulation were conducted in a 670 meter by 670 meter flat space filled with a scattering of 50 wireless nodes. For each network, two connection patterns were generated. For both connection patterns, fixed-size packets of 512 bytes were continuously injected.
A. Corrz,ritmicarion Patterns
For our experiments, we used the CMU's traffic-pattern generator [I]. The nodes communicate using I O connections. Three nodes are sources for two connections each, and four nodes are sources for one connection each. Eight of the destinations receive only one flow and the ninth receives two flows.
B. Movement Patterns
Since the unobtrusive.monitoring technique is specifically designed to work with mobile ad-hoc networks, randomly generated mobile networks were simulated conforming to the random waypoint mobility model [8]. In the random waypoint model of mobility, nodes choose a destination and move in a straight line toward the destination at a speed uniformly distributed between 0 meterslsecond (mls) and some maximum speed. A maximum speed of 20 mis (IO mls on average) will be set for the mobile nodes based on the speeds suggested in [IO] . The simulation time was set to 200 seconds for detectingmisbehavior in which a node disrupts communication by misrouting packets.
Once a node reaches its destination, it waits for the pause time before choosing a random destination and repeating the process. Pause times of 5 and 30.seconds were used. Two networks with 50 nodes in a 670 meter by 670 meter area were generated as suggested in [5], [I I]. Nodes in network 1 were paused for 30 seconds (with a maximum speed of 5 meterlsecond) between movements to model low mobility networks, while nodes in network 2 were paused for 5 seconds (with a maximum speed of 20 meterdsecond) to model high mobility networks.
C. Misbehaving Nodes
It is interesting to study the proposed algorithms in a more hostile environment than encountered in real life. Therefore, each network is designed to contain 20 malicious nodes reflecting misbehavior of 40% of the nodes as suggested in [12] . Each malicious node is configured to drop all the packets it receives starting at some randomly chosen time. The number and the placement of,the malicious nodes ensures that they will be located along active paths in the network. A staggered approach is introduced to ensure that at least one node is misbehaving for most of the duration of the simulation.
To notice the effectiveness of our approach, the percentage of misbehaving nodes was vaned from 0% to 40% in 5% increments. Tcl's [I41 built in pseudo-random generator is used to designate misbehaving nodes randomly.
D. Performance Metrics
The primary metrics for evaluating the performance of the proposed unobtrusive monitoring technique are detection effectiveness and false positives. I ) Defection Effectiveness: Detection effectiveness measures how well the technique does at detecting malicious events or congested behavior. For example, if the node detects each and every instance a malicious node drops a packet, then the detection effectiveness is 100%; but if the node does not detect any misbehavior, the detection effectiveness is 0%.
Identification of malicious behavior is essential. For example, if a node experiences more than three TCP timeouts and there is no indication of a broken link, then a node in the path is either misbehaving or is overloaded. Additional information must then be used to clearly identify the rationale behind the behavior.
2) False Positives: Reporting malicious behavior when none occurred is called a "false positive." To permit comparison between different scenarios, the number of false positives is normalized by the number of reported events. If every reported event is incorrect, then the node has 100% false positives; on the other hand, if every reported event is indeed a malicious event, then the false positive rate if 0% (however, our detection effectiveness may be less than 100%). A perfect system will have a detection effectiveness of 100% and 0% false positives, but this ideal is not always possible [6] , [7] .
E. Detection Interval
The length of the time that the data storage unit retains data imposes a limit on the detection interval, which is the length of time the data analysis component will attempt to match data. If a node uses a larger detection interval, it would include route error messages which are not related to the event in question, Fig. 2 . Detection effectiveness for low mobility random networks mistake that the packet dropping was caused by broken links, and disregards the packet dropping. For our experiments the total length of the detection interval is set to he the same as the data storage components' purge interval.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For our experiments, we considered the case of packet dropping leading to Communication disruption. Performance metrics considered were detection effectiveness and false positive. Experiments were conducted for the two scenarios described before. Ten different TCP traffic patterns with a maximum of 20 connections were generated using the CMU's traffic generator. The final results were taken as the average of these ten traffic patterns. Measurements were taken for 32 second, 40 second, and 48 second detection intervals. The malicious nodes in each network were designed to start misbehaving at some random time and drop all the data packets they receive.
A. Detection €&fivenezs
We plotted the detection effectiveness of low mobility network and high mobility network by varying the percentage of malicious nodes (see Figures 2 and 3) . The detection effectiveness improves as the percentage of malicious nodes increase in both the networks. As expected, the average detection effectiveness of malicious node in low mobility network is better than that in high mobility network as shown in Figures 2 and 3 . With increase in node mobility, the number of route error messages due to route maintenance increases. So, within a detection interval, there is an increase in route error messages received at the source node influencing the detection effectiveness. Also, notice that increasing the detection interval lowers the detection effectiveness slightly because there will be more route error messages in the larger detection interval when compared to the smaller one. 
B. False Positives
We plotted the false positives of both low mobility and high mobility networks by varying the percentage of malicious nodes. As in the case of detection effectiveness, the false positives improve with increase in the percentage of malicious nodes for both low mobility network and high mobility network. Notice that there is no significant increase in false positives with increased mobility. This may be because the false positives are more influenced by detection interval rather than by node mobility. From Figures 4 and 5 , we can see that increasing the detection interval decreases the false positives.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Securing MANETS is an emerging research area with practical applications. In this paper we present a solution to locate malicious or faulty nodes that drop packets. Our methodology employs a detection manager which uses information from various network levels to detect malicious nodes. The detection manager stores rules for responding to different situations. In our implementation, we have conducted experiments to detect tnalicious behavior when iiialicious node drops packets. Simulation 'results are encouraging in the sense that our technique has high detection effectiveness with reasonable false positive rate. Currently we are conducting experiments to enhance the detection manager with more rules to react to other kinds of misbehavior such as misrouting and to work with additional routing protocols such as AODV and DSDV. We are also planning to evaluate our technique in the presence
